Somalia’s coast. The recent resurgence of piracy has led the Joint Maritime Information Center to raise its threat level for piracy off the Somali Coast and in the Somali Basin to “severe.”
Somali piracy peaked in 2011–2012, costing the global economy almost an additional $7 billion in 2011 alone, according to one estimate. Unlike the previous period, where piracy was a direct “symptom of the breakdown of Somalia’s political system,” recent renewed attacks are driven by opportunism linked to geopolitical shifts that have been building over the past few months.
The European-led naval mission, EU NAVFOR (Operation Atalanta), continues to monitor and patrol the waters in coordination with bilateral partners.
Rather than a significant reduction in patrolling, monitoring, or deterrence, the increase is driven by shifting dynamics resulting from the outbreak of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran in late February, the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and the continued coordination between the al Shabaab–Houthi alliance that can capitalize on the region’s piracy dynamics. Critically, these factors have increased shipping traffic around Somalia.
With the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed, the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern tip of the Red Sea has become one of the most critical chokepoints in the global economy. Saudi Arabia is routing millions of barrels of oil per day through a pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea to keep exports flowing. Yet shipping companies have also reduced traffic through the Bab al-Mandab Strait in response to the war. In the opening weeks of the Iran war, major container carriers, including Maersk, CMA, CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd, suspended or diverted scheduled services transiting through the strait. This, combined with Houthi attacks on shipping that had already significantly reduced traffic, led to even greater reductions.
Instead of passing through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, shipping is being rerouted around Southern Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. An estimated 70 percent of the ocean freight traffic that previously moved through the Red Sea is now being rerouted around Africa’s southern tip. Other estimates put the increase in shipping traffic around the Cape of Good Hope as high as 112 percent in March this year.
Sitting at the intersection of shipping lanes to the Red Sea and routes to and from Southern Africa is Somalia. While most ships still take a wide berth rather than hugging the coast, the increase in traffic is creating resurgent piracy opportunities.
Somalia’s Current Constitutional Dispute
At the same time, the focus on Somali piracy is diverting attention from a constitutional dispute between the federal government in Mogadishu and the leadership of its federal member states. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term under Somalia’s 2012 provisional constitution is set to expire on May 15, 2026. In March, as part of a review process to move from a provisional to a permanent constitution, the federal parliament passed a range of constitutional amendments, including one that extended presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years. The government claims this amendment applies to the current administration and that President Hassan Sheikh’s term now ends on May 15, 2027.
Opposition leaders and key federal member states, including influential administrations in Puntland and Jubaland, have rejected this change outright. Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni has been direct, saying that in his view, if no agreement is reached, “the federal government will no longer be considered in existence” as of that date. Few, if any, believe there will be any agreement before May 15.
It would be tempting to treat this as another episode in Somalia’s long-running political instability. Somalia’s governance challenges are well established and, to many, expected. However, the reality is that Somalia’s governance trajectory over the past 15 years represents a genuine state-building achievement, albeit imperfect, incomplete, and fragile.
When the Transitional Federal Government gave way to the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012, backed by an internationally supported framework, the country had to rebuild, establish, or integrate almost every state institution. What has followed is a story of real progress. New subnational political entities called federal member states—Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle—now exist as functioning political units with their own security forces, administrations, and developing revenue streams. Hundreds of new district administrations within these states have been formally constituted. The Somali National Army, while still losing out to al Shabaab in several areas, has grown into a professional force capable of sustained operations. Puntland’s regional maritime force has been the first responder to recent piracy attacks. Somalia has developed new economic relationships and, in 2023, joined the East African Community, further integrating the country into regional economic governance.
This is not to say that Somalia has emerged as a consolidated, stable political entity. Remaining a formidable threat, al Shabaab has reversed significant territorial gains made by the federal government in 2025, maintained checkpoints within striking distance of Mogadishu, and is operating shadow-taxation regimes in multiple parts of the country. The humanitarian situation remains dire and cyclical. The political system is prone to elite capture and infighting. And the economy is minute in comparative terms. Despite all of this, the architecture of the federal state has gained real acceptance and been institutionalized over the past 15 years, benefiting from enormous investments of international political capital, international support, and military resources from the U.S. and the broader international community.
A Role for Diplomacy
The United States has been one of the most consequential external partners throughout this period. Since 2012, the United States has directed several billion dollars in combined military, peacekeeping, and governance assistance toward Somalia and Somalia-related multilateral missions such as the African Union Mission in Somalia and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. The U.S. Africa Command has been operating in direct partnership with the federal government, the Somali military, and the federal member states, providing airstrikes targeting al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. This is in addition to years of support the United States has provided to train special forces, equip troops, advocate for debt relief, and facilitate international investment.
What happens to the legacy of this support and the real political progress Somalia has made over the last decade and a half if the federal government’s legitimacy collapses? While every political system faces the push and pull of power between the center and decentralized entities, May 15 represents a real challenge for Somalia’s political consolidation. A fracture in Somalia’s federal legitimacy threatens the gains made over the last decade and a half and can have further knock-on effects.
Somalia is facing this challenge at a time of particularly large upheaval in its close neighbors, international trade routes, and international partners. This upcoming challenge to the political system asks questions of whether current institutions will continue to survive and consolidate in the face of elite competition and contested legitimacy. External partners may have to choose sides in the domestic dispute, potentially further challenging the federal government’s authority.
Additionally, the international community, which has so often been a critical input into Somalia’s political transition, has been less vocal regarding the current political crisis. The absence has a distinct impact on Somalia’s governance architecture. While a heavy-handed international response does not align with the current geopolitical moment, constructive diplomatic engagements can provide opportunities for reconciliation and an accommodating path forward that supports and strengthens the country’s political structures, which have coincided with decreases in international threats emanating from Somalia, such as piracy.
As piracy off Somalia’s coast takes the headlines, a longer-term view of the country’s current political situation redirects us to the events threatening the relative but significant stability gains the country has made. Piracy returns when the conditions for it exist. Recent piracy incidents stem from opportunism, with shifting shipping routes driven by geopolitical dynamics. However, long-term piracy results from ungoverned coastlines, weakened institutions, and reduced political costs. May 15 is a stress test of Somalia’s federal architecture that has, however imperfectly, contributed to the increasing suppression of those conditions over the past 15 years. While Somalia’s internal political disputes may have little resonance in current international dialogues, they may have important implications for the future of global shipping and the economy.
By: Aaron Stanley
Aaron Stanley is deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
